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1. Introduction
During recent years, there has been increasing focus on structural economic policy and performance.
This means policies working primarily through the supply side of the economy, affecting either the
potential output or the overall flexibility of the economy. A major area of interest has been to define
and calculate indicators of government assistance. Governments have a number of instruments for
assisting private firms, including budgetary subsidies, trade policies and indirect and direct taxes. In
some of these areas, information is readily available, in budget documents or other official sources.
Other forms of assistance to industries, such as non-tariff trade barriers and other regulatory practices,
are less transparent.
Empirical studies of government subsidies and transfers have been carried out within the OECD for
specific industries, such as the agricultural sector. Discussions have also taken place within the
organisation regarding the possibilities of establishing operational, more comprehensive indicators of
government support to industries, see e.g. Argy, Plunkett and Wilson (1992).
One such generalised measure is Effective Rates of Assistance (ERA). This is a summary measure of
how government subsidies, protection and other forms of assistance affect the overall profitability
(measured by a value added price) of a sector. A main purpose is to make various forms of assistance
comparable and transparent. Moreover, underlying the use of the ERA concept is a perception that it
can be used as an indicator of how different kinds of government policies affect the sectorial allocation
of resources in the economy. Industries which are most heavily supported as measured by ERA, have
improved their relative competitive position compared to a situation without government assistance.
Accordingly, they may have expanded their production levels and use of resources.
ERA is a generalisation of the concept "Effective Rates of Protection" (ERP) which was introduced by
Corden (1966). While the latter is restricted to the question of how nominal tariffs affect the allocation
of primary production factors, ERA extends this idea to include other forms of government support as
well. For a small open economy, a well known result from the classical trade theory is that, given
certain assumptions, an increase in the price of a good (e.g. due to a nominal tariff) relative to other
prices induces an expansion of the domestic production of this commodity. Thus, by observing the
direction of relative price changes, one has qualitative information about the corresponding changes in
industry structure and use of resources. Unfortunately, this relation between price- and quantity
changes is no longer unique when extending the simple model to include intermediate inputs, non-
traded commodities and multiple outputsl. To analyse impacts on the resource allocation in a more
general setting, a complete general equilibrium model is needed. As opposed to this, the calculation of
ERA restricts the analysis to the measurement of price effects. Thus, the rationale for using ERA as an
indicator for distortions of the industry structure, implicitly relies upon the assumption that there still
is a positive correlation between the relative pattern of these price effects and the industry structure.
In the original article of Corden (1966), fixed coefficients for intermediate inputs were assumed. Discussions of how the
ERP concept is affected by more general forms of factor subsitution are provided by Jones (1971), Corden (1971) and Ethier
(1972). Bruno (1973) and Woodland (1982) analyse the issue of tariff protection within a general equilibrium framework. A
rather comprehensive discussion of the interpretation of the ERA concept and the relation to general equlibrium effects is
given by Holrnoy, Hægeland, Olsen and Strom (1993).
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Since it is the effects on relative prices that matters, ERA should be calculated for an exhaustive set of
industries in an economy to serve its purpose.
The present paper reports from a project of calculating ERA for Norwegian industries, see HohnØY,
Hægeland, Olsen and Strom (1993). Strictly, such calculations should include all forms of government
policy measures. In practice, calculations of ERA have to be based on some kind of a priori selection
of main types of assistance. In the current study, three main areas have been analysed: indirect taxes
and subsidies imposed on industries over fiscal budgets, nominal tariffs and other (non-tariff) trade
barriers, and taxation of primary production factors. The ERA calculations, based on data for 1989,
indicate that a number of industries in Norway benefited substantially from the various forms of
government assistance that were in effect this year. Not surprisingly, agriculture stands out as by far
the most supported industry. However, according to the calculations, also the fisheries, the ship
building industry and the supply sectors to the off-shore industry were favoured through the
government policies considered in this study.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a stylised version of the simulation
model actually used for the ERA calculations. The data for the various types of government assistance
are surveyed in section 3, while section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2. A framework for calculating ERA
The model framework used for ERA calculations distinguishes between N = 41 commodities and M =
28 production sectors, of which 20 are private industries2. Below, the formal ERA-model is presented.
In order to keep the exposition of the basic aspects clearer, some details in the representation of
indirect taxes and subsidies are suppressed3 .
The calculations are based on a set of price equations ruling out pure profits in any sector j (j =
1,2,...,M):
Nbi? pi* (1+ tii )+	 bgp1 + si
i=1
	 i=T+1
T	 N ,	 \ 
12
„
(1+ tii )(1+ tY — E bfI-p.	 t
,
)— i41011+til )--bitw`" (l+ t i.c ) = 0if	 I. 	 1	 1	 1	 1	 1	 .1i=1	 i=T+1
(1)
In (1) p7 is the exogenous world price of commodity i. The first T of totally N commodities are
traded internationally. pi is the producer price of non-traded commodity i. t,' and t 	 the net
commodity tax and the nominal tariff rate on commodity i respectively. b and big are fixed input-
and output coefficients respectively. bf and bp are input coefficients expressing the capital and
labour requirement per unit of total output. wf and w.t are net-of-tax service prices received by
2
 We have excluded the petroleum sector from the analysis, since the activity in this industry is highly regulated by the
government.
3 A detailed description of the model is given in Holmoy et al (1993).
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owners of capital and labour in sector j, while tf and tf are effective tax rates on services from these
primary inputs. si denotes net subsidies to industry.e.
In the traditional model of a small open economy, the factor prices of labour and capital are assumed
to be equalised between sectors in equilibrium. The equation system in (1) then determines the level
of these factor prices and the prices of non-traded commodities, i.e. (N - T) + 2 variables. Moreover,
the model determines which sectors that will be active through specialisation. Normally, the
equilibrium number of sectors will equal (N - T) + 2. These sectors are able to pay the maximum
remuneration to labour and capital without violating (1).
When calculating ERA, a quite different problem is solved compared to the small open economy
model. Now both the actually observed industry structure and the net-of-tax service prices received by
owners of capital and labour are taken as given. We then calculate the change in the left hand side of
(1) that follows from changes of the specified policy parameters. The resulting relative change is
defined as the ERA-effect. This figure summarises all effects on net-of-tax factor income per unit of
production from different policy measures. In the following we will refer to the net-of-tax factor
income pr unit of production as the effective value added price5. The ERA-effect may alternatively be
interpreted as the change in net-of-tax factor income necessary in order to maintain the price-cost
balance represented by (1). ERA is defined as the ERA-effect of a complete elimination of all policy
instruments introduced in (1).
For a sector being the sole producer of a non-traded commodity, cost changes are shifted forward to
corresponding changes in the output price, leaving the effective value added price unchanged. With a
joint output technology, each sector produces in general both traded and non-traded commodities.
Still, in our model framework we distinguish between sheltered and exposed industries. A sheltered
industry is defined as the main producer of a non-traded commodity. By assumption, for sheltered
industries changes in costs are reflected in corresponding shifts in the output prices. Thus, for these
sectors, a'simultaneous system of (N - T) equations similar to those specified in (1), determines the
prices of (N - T) non-traded commodities. It follows that the ERA-effect of any policy change is
bound to be zero for sheltered industries. However, the cost shifts in sheltered industries due to policy
changes are measured by the changes in the prices of non-traded commodities. These will be discussed
in the empirical part of this paper.
Exposed industries are by definition main producers of traded commodities with exogenous world
prices. For these sectors, policy changes can be transformed into ERA-effects. We have computed
ERA-effects by solving the system in (1) where the net subsidies to industry j, sj, has been written as
P ES•j 	J=S• +s- J (2)
where s •P denotes the actual net subsidies to industry 	 Ej , and s is a hypothetical net subsidy to sector jJ	 J
which exactly compensates the effect on net-of-tax factor income per unit of production induced by a
policy change. Thus, in the equation system (1) 4 is treated as an endogenous variable. For a
4 In the national accounts, these are classified as "non-commodity" taxes and subsidies, see also section 3.
The net-of-tax factor income per unit of production is often labelled the "effective output price".
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sheltered industry, s7 =
 O . Inserting (2) into (1), the ERA-model consists of M equations
determining (N - T) prices of non-traded commodities and the (M - N + T) hypothetical net subsidy
rates. The ERA-effect is computed as the relative change in sf . It should be noted that the input-
output structure of the model implies that the ERA for an exposed industry accounts for both policy
changes directly affecting incomes and costs in the same sector as well as indirect effects caused by
changes in the prices of non-traded commodities used as inputs.
Within the group of sheltered sectors, a further distinction can be made between naturally sheltered
sectors, and what may be denoted protected sectors. A protected sector is defined as the main
producer of a tradable commodity which is subject to non-tariff (quantitative) trade barriers (NTBs).
In effect, protected sectors are able to set prices in the same way as sheltered industries. (In Norway,
agriculture represents a typical example of a protected industry.) It is well known that the wedge
between the domestic price and the world price of a protected commodity can be interpreted as an
equivalent tariff rate or a shadow price of the import barrier. In order to simulate the ERA-effect of
NTBs, the producer price of a protected commodity is decomposed in the following way:
ps =p:(1+t5 )(1+tsE ), SEP
	 (3)
where tsE is the equivalent tariff rate corresponding to the NTB restricting imports of commodity s.
The set P of protected commodities is included in the set of non-traded commodities {T+1,...,N}.
When integrating protected sectors in the ERA calculations, it is useful to distinguish between
i) effects of removing the non-tariff trade barriers
ii) effects of changing or removing other forms of government assistance
To analyse i) is rather straightforward. Technically, when trade barriers for a protected commodity are
removed completely, the equivalent tariff rate is set to 0 so that the domestic producer price is equal
to the world price including the nominal tariff. Furthermore, sE is endogenised for the sector being the
main producer of this commodity. In effect, this industry is transformed from a sheltered to an
exposed sector; the output price will be reduced with the size of the equivalent tariff, and this price
effect can be transformed to an ERA-effect as described above.
When calculating the ERA-effects corresponding to ii), the results will depend on what is assumed to
happen with the implicit protection through trade bathers. We may distinguish between two polar
interpretations. The first assumes that the quantitative barriers are kept constant, whereas their
corresponding (shadow) values measured by the equivalent tariff rates adjust endogenously.
Technically, the equivalent tariff rate is determined by (3) after having found the producer price from
(1). In this case, sectors which are main producers of protected commodities can be treated as strictly
sheltered; changes in costs are fully compensated through adjustments in domestic output prices, and
the ERA-effect is identically zero. In this case a rise in the world price or the nominal tariff rate has
no effect on the producer price as long as the constraint on import is constant and effective.
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The second interpretation assumes that the NTBs adjust so that their corresponding equivalent tariff
rates are kept constant. Technically, this implies that protected industries can be analysed in the same
way as exposed sectors, and specifically, that ERA can be calculated even for this group of industries.
3. Data and empirical implementation
Within the model framework presented above, the following policy measures relevant for ERA
calculations can be identified:
1) indirect taxes and subsidies
2) effective tax rates on labour
3) effective tax rates on capital
4) regulated prices of intermediate inputs
5) nominal tariffs
6) non-tariff barriers to trade
In this section, we briefly describe how the data for the different kinds of goverment assistance to
Norwegian industries have been uncovered. All data refer to the year 1989. Thus, in the ERA
calculations presented in section 4, changes have been made in policy variables estimated for that year.
3.1 Indirect taxes and subsidies
The major conceptual framework for the ERA calculations is the Norwegian national accounts, which
provide base year data for input-output coefficients and prices in the formal model. The national
accounts also form the data basis for indirect taxes, subsidies and tariffs included in the model.
Two main categories of indirect taxes and subsidies are distinguished in the national accounts;
commodity taxes and other (non-commodity) taxes6. While commodity taxes are related to commodity
flows in the accounts, the non-commodity taxes are imposed on industries. Differences in the latter
type between sectors thus indicate government assistance. On the other hand, commodity taxes are
neutral, in the sense that they do not discriminate between source of delivery, either domestically or
between Norwegian or foreign producers. It should, however, be noted that changes in commodity
taxes and subsidies have indirect effects in the ERA calculations, via intermediate deliveries, see (1)
above.
In Norway, the proceeds from non-commodity taxes and subsidies show substantial amounts, as seen
from table 1. In 1989, the total value of subsidies to industries in the national accounts exceeded 35
bill. NOK, near 5 percent of GDP. At the same time, industries paid more than 16 bill. NOK in taxes
to the central government. While commodity taxes totalled 28,5 bill. NOK in 1989, commodity
subsidies were almost insignificant.
6 As a matter of convenience, in the following we use the word "taxes" for both positive and negative magnitudes, i.e.
covering also subsidies.
Table 1: Indirect taxes and subsidies in the National accounts.
Billions NOK, 1989.
Sector subsidies	 35,2
Sector taxes	 16,4
Commodity subsidies	 1,4
Commodity taxes	 28,5
Source: Statistics Norway
Within the ERA context, a major problem is that all the items listed as taxes or subsidies in the
national accounts should not be counted as support to specific industries. To take some examples, the
national account figures comprise outlays on labour market measures and support to cultural
institutions. Moreover, to some extent, general funding of research is also placed under the heading
"subsidy" in the national accounts.
Given these problems of classification and the purpose of the present study, it was necessary to
undertake a detailed evaluation of all items for non-commodity taxes and subsidies in the national
accounts. This proved useful in two ways. First, based on supplementary information, a number of
changes in the tax flows were undertaken. For instance, a portion of the amounts placed as "general
research purposes" was redistributed to specific sectors, likely to benefit from this kind of support7 .
Second, by surveying and evaluating the detailed tax items, we had a good starting point for carrying
out the ERA calculations. In these calculations discussed in the next section, sector subsidies totalling
about 18 bill. NOK are removed. At the same time, we have nullified 12 bill. NOK of taxes imposed
on production sectors, while commodity taxes are reduced by more than 16 bill. NOK compared to the
actual situation in 1989.
3.2 Trade policies
As mentioned, the national accounts also include data on the structure of nominal tariffs. Over the
years, this kind of protection has become less important in the Norwegian economy. This is confirmed
by table 2, which shows that the nominal tariff rates estimated for 1989 are quite small. It should be
stressed that the calculated tariffs in table 2 are based on import weights, through the aggregation over
commodities in the National accounts. Import weights are generally regarded as inferior to production
weights when measuring the effect on domestic prices from tariffs. However, detailed production
weights were not available at this stage of the project. Moreover, the tariff rates in table 2 are average
rates, based on an observed composition of imports from different countries. Nominal tariffs on
imports from specific countries may be significantly higher than these figures. If commodities from
different parts of the world are close substitutes, the fall in domestic prices following a removal of
tariffs, may be stronger than expressed by the estimated average rates.
NTBs include a number of measures (other than nominal tariffs) with the aim of protecting domestic
producers from foreign competition. Examples of non-tariff restrictions on trade are
7 A detailed overview of all reclassifications and changes in tax flows is given in HolmOy et al (1993).
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• quotas on imports of foreign commodities
• preferences for domestic producers in government contracts
• voluntary export restraints
• technical trade barriers (standards, design)
To include NTBs in ERA calculations, involves a number of problems both conceptually and
computationally 8. First, there are major problems of identification. Internationally, the UNCTAD
classification scheme has become the de facto accepted definition of NTBs. Second, the existence of
NTBs must be translated into equivalent tariff rates consistent with the ERA framework described in
section 2.
In the case of imperfect competition, quantitative import restrictions provide opportunities for
domestic producers to reap monopoly profit. In order to neutralise or reduce such potential benefits to
domestic producers, NTBs are often combined with price regulations. Within the ERA framework, this
means that prices are exogenous, so that formally such industries can be treated in line with exposed
sectors. The highly different interpretations of exposed versus protected and regulated industries
should, however, be kept in mind.
In order to identify and estimate equivalent tariff rates for Norwegian industries, data on domestic
producer prices and world prices of corresponding commodities are necessary but not sufficient. In
addition, information about commodity characteristics and various kinds of regulations motivating
differences between Norwegian and corresponding world prices is required. At this point we have
made no attempt to carry out independent studies of estimating implicit tariffs. Instead, our strategy
has been to collect relevant information and utilise results from available studies aiming at assessing
tariff equivalents. A detailed discussion of these results on NTBs and equivalent tariff rates are given
in HohnOy et al (1993). Here, only some major areas of government regulations and principles guiding
our choices are presented. The resulting estimates for implicit tariffs for the various sectors in our
ERA model are shown in the third column of table 2.
In addition to being supported by subsidies and income transfers over government budgets, Norwegian
agriculture is sheltered from foreign competition by import quotas on all major products. This is
combined with strict price regulations, in particular for dairy farm products. The estimate of the
equivalent tariff rate for this sector is mainly based on OECD's calculations of "Producer Subsidy
Equivalents" (PSE). For each member country, these comprise a comparison of domestic and world
market prices for a detailed list of commodities. The PSE calculations are supplemented with
comparisons of Norwegian and Danish9 prices provided by the Norwegian Agricultural Research
Institute, to account for differences in product refinement and classification in the sample of
commodities used by OECD. Based on this information, we have estimated an average equivalent
tariff rate for agricultural commodities of 190 percent. As seen from table 2, this is much higher than
for any of the other commodities specified in the model framework.
8A comprehensive overview of NTBs is given in Laird and Yeats (1990).
9Denmark is likely to be the main exporter of agricultural commodities to Norway under a free trade regime.
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Table 2: Nominal and equivalent tariff rates by commodity group. Percent, 1989.
Commodity group Nominal tariff rates Equivalent tariff rates
Agricultural Commodities 1,7 190,0
Commodities from Forestry 0,2 -
Commodities from Fishery 0,0 -
Processed Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1,3 9,5
Textiles and Wearing Apparels 3,5 6,2
Various Manufacturing Products 0,5 3,3
Pharmaceutical Products •• 15,0
Cement •• 80,0
Pulp and Paper Articles 0,0 -
Industrial Chemicals 0,4 3,2
Fertilisers .• 16,0
Refined Petroleum Products 0,0 -
Metals 0,2 -
Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment 1,1 3,2
Office Macinery 0• 9,0
Electric Motors and Generators •• 42,0
Electric Household Machinery •• 17,0
Repair 0,0 -
Ships 0,0 0,0
Oil Production Platforms 0,1 7,7
" " means that data are not available. "-" means nil.
Imports of commodities included in the group Processed Food, Beverages and Tobacco are subject to
extensive regulations through quotas. Regarding imports from the EU, the quantitative restrictions on
trade are limited to food products. From other parts of the world, quotas exist for a broader set of
products. In
 addition, for some commodities imports are restricted by technical standards. The main
source of information for assessing price differentials for food and beverages has been Statistics
Norway (1990), presenting so-called Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) calculations. These data enable us
to use consumer prices net of indirect taxes from nine member countries of EU (not including Spain,
Portugal and Greece), or alternatively, one of these countries individually, as a reference of
measurement. To minimise problems of transportation costs included in the price estimates, we have
chosen the price levels in Denmark as a basis for assessing the differences between Norwegian and
international prices of food and beverages. As revealed from table 2, this has resulted in an implicit
tariff of 9,5 percent for this commodity group as a whole.
Trade in textiles and clothes (included in the group Textiles and Wearing Apparels) are limited by the
voluntary export agreements organised through the Multifiber Arrangement. However, these
agreements apply primarily to imports from low-cost countries in the third world. Based on Melchior
(1993) , the average equivalent tariff rate protecting Norwegian producers of such commodities is
estimated to 6 percent.
For important manufacturing products in Norway, such as fertilisers and cement, the domestic market
is de facto monopolised. For these products, formal barriers to trade do not exist. However, in the
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cement market, there are clear indications of trade being restricted by implicit agreements between
major producers in different countries to supply their respective domestic market. For fertilisers,
Norsk Hydro supplies more than 90 percent of the domestic market, having a significant share of the
European market as well. For both these manufacturing products, price regulations prevent the
Norwegian producers to exploit all of their potential monopoly power. As mentioned above, the
presence of imperfect competition complicates the interpretation of implicit tariffs. Based on the
available information provided in
 Sørgård (1992) and Gabrielsen (1989), implicit tariff rates of 80 and
16 percent are estimated for cement and fertilisers respectively.
Several studies indicate that a number of Norwegian industries are favoured, either directly through
government procurement, or indirectly via requirements to specific commodity standards or technical
designs. According to Norman (1990), the latter barriers are the main source underlying the estimated
equivalent tariff rates for Pharmaceutical Products and for the commodity groups constituting Metal
Products, Machinery and Equipment in table 2. Regarding government procurement, focus is
frequently on industries taking part in the deliveries to the petroleum sector. At this point, the official
policy was that Norwegian firms should be preferred if their prices are competitive. Still,
investigations and comparisons between prices offered by Norwegian and foreign suppliers indicate
significant price differentials in 1989. Although major uncertainties exist, we impose an implicit tariff
of 11 percent on imports to the petroleum sector.
3.3 Price discrimination in the electricity market
More than 99 percent of the Norwegian electricity consumption is produced by domestic hydro power
plants. The studies by Johnsen (1991) and Bye and Johnsen (1991) show that large price differentials
exist in the Norwegian electricity market, which cannot be accounted for by corresponding cost
differentials. This price discrimination is a result of an explicit government policy, since the
Norwegian electricity market has traditionally been highly regulated10. The individual hydro power
producers sell their electricity (competitively) to regional distribution companies and to some large
firms within the group of the energy intensive industries Manufacture of Metals, Manufacture of
Industrial Chemicals and Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles. The presumably most important
kind of price discrimination on (hydro power) electricity has taken place through favourable long-term
contracts between the producing plants and these firms.
The quantification of rates of price discrimination in the electricity market in 1989 is based on
Johnsen (1991). In short, the method decomposes the purchaser prices of electricity to different
sectors into i) a uniform producer price on homogenous electricity, ii) various sector specific cost
components reflecting qualitative differences between the deliveries to different sectors and HD a
residual price-cost margin. The differences in these margins are interpreted as a measure of price
discrimination. Regarding qualitative heterogeneity of the hydro power deliveries to different sectors,
the observed differentials in the purchaser prices are corrected for the following elements: First,
energy intensive industries have a higher utilisation time than other users. Norwegian Water
Resources Administration has calculated that the long-mn marginal cost on deliveries of hydro power
to energy intensive industries equals 89 percent of the average long-run marginal cost on deliveries to
other sectors. Second, the distribution costs (including power losses) differ. Third, the security of
10In 1992, implementation of a new "Energy Law" implied substantial deregulation of the Norwegian electricity market
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delivery differs between different categories of electricity. Surplus power is inferior to contracted
deliveries, and this is reflected in the price structure. Fourth, indirect taxes on electricity differ
between sectors.
Table 3: Rates of price discrimination on electricity (in percent of the producer price)
by industry, 1989.
Exposed industries
Agriculture	 36,4
Forestry	 36,4
Fishing and breeding of fish etc.	 36,4
Manufacture of Consumption Goods	 29,5
Manufacture of Intermediate Inputs and Capital Goods	 -9,1
Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles	 -61,9
Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals 	 -12,8
Petroleum Refining	 -39,2
Manufacture of Metals	 -40,1
Manufacture of Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment	 8,9
Building of Ships and Oil-Platforms	 43,2
Sheltered industries
Production of Electricity
Construction, excl. Oil Well Drilling 	 73,6
Wholesale and Retail Trade	 54,3
Domestic Transport	 -14,4
Finance and Insurance	 62,0
Dwelling services	 43,7
Other Private Services	 52,2
"-" means nil.
Table 3 reports the computed rates of price discrimination on electricity in 1989. The industries
Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Products, Petroleum Refining and Manufacture of Metals were
relatively heaviest subsidised through favourable prices of electricity this year. The implicit subsidies
were slightly lower for the sectors Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals and Manufacture of
Intermediate Inputs and Capital Goods. On the other hand the construction sector and private services
paid higher prices than implied by cost pricing.
3.4 Sectorial differences in the effective taxation of income from fixed capital
The effective tax rate on capital income from sector j, tf , is calculated as
K Wi (t 
K
1 • = KW- (0)
(4)
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wfc (t) is the user cost of capital under the actual tax system and w /-c (0) is the user cost in the case ofJ
neutral capital income taxation given by the standard formula
wf (0)=(i + • j )q	 (5)
where i is the nominal interest rate, Si is the rate of "true" economic depreciation including physical
deterioration and capital gains. (5) is derived from the neoclassical model of intertemporal
competitive producer behaviour assuming that the producer maximises the present value of the cash-
flow received by the owner of the capital. A neutral tax system is characterised by a design that does
not affect the relative profitability of the different options available for the investor. Thus, under
neutral capital income taxation tax rates have no impact on the user cost. From (4) it is clear that the
effective tax rates summarise the total impact on capital costs from the different elements of the tax
system. The lower the effective tax rate, the stronger is investment in fixed capital favoured relative to
financial assets through the tax system.
The user cost of capital under the actual tax system has been calculated by applying the same method
and data as those described in Holmoy, Larsen and Vennemo (1993) 11 . The theoretical model of
financial decisions is the same as in Sinn (1987). Since the value of the firm is calculated from the
owner's point of view, the taxation on both the corporate and the personal level is taken into account.
The user cost of capital depends on
1) the type of capital invested, because depreciation and depreciation allowances differ between
capital goods
2) whether the firm is incorporated or a personal enterprise, due to different tax rules
3) the source of finance
Independent of legal status, the user cost facing a firm can be expressed as:
(t)=13 .d. 	 — V)e.+5• — c•JJ (6)
where f3 	 the maximum debt equity share, ci is the tax credit implied by the difference between true
economic depreciation and the rules of depreciation allowances and taxation of capital gains, di and ei
are the interest costs of debt financing and equity financing respectively. The relationship between
these interest costs depends on whether the firm is legally organised as a personal or an incorporated
enterprise. In particular, an incorporated enterprise choose retained profits or issues of new shares as
the source of equity financing depending on what is the cheapest alternative. The detailed relationship
between the various elements specified in (6) and the tax parameters is given in Holmøy, Larsen and
Vennemo (1993).
Table 4 reports the tax rates relevant to the user cost calculations in 1989. The rates of depreciation
allowances are reported in table 5 together with the assumed rates of physical capital depreciation.
'Expectations are assumed to be static, i.e. the tax system, prices of output, capital goods and other factors, depreciation and
interest rates are assumed to prevail constant in the future.
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The difference between the "true" depreciation and the depreciation allowances according to the tax
code is essential for the non-neutrality of the tax system and thereby the effective taxation of income
from fixed capital. Reliable estimates of the rates of actual depreciation are of course difficult to
obtain. We have, in lack of any better alternatives, relied on the depreciation rates provided by the
national accounts in Norway. The relevant measure of actual depreciation takes capital gains into
account in addition to physical depreciation. In the calculation these gains were set to 4 percent which
approximates the actual growth in prices of new capital goods in 1989.
The user cost of capital by sector is obtained in the following way: First, we calculate the user cost of
capital for the capital goods Enterprise Buildings, Other Buildings and Constructions, Machinery,
Ships and Boats, Aircraft and Other Transport Equipment. The share of each capital good in the total
fixed capital stock is given by the national accounts asset-to-industry matrix that prevailed in 1989.
For each capital good a corresponding user cost is calculated for both incorporated and personal
enterprises. The distribution of firms with respect to these two alternatives of legal status are taken
from Statistics Norway (1991). For both incorporated and personal enterprises a maximum constraint
on the debt-equity ratio is assumed to be effective. For personal enterprises retained profits is the only
alternative to borrowing. Housing is given a special treatment described by Berg (1989).
Table 4: Formal tax rates. Percent, 1989.
Incorporated enterprises
Profits
Dividends
Sales of physical capital
Wealth
Personal enterprises
Ordinary tax on profits
Profits in primary industries
Persons
Interest income
Dividends
Capital sains  
50,8
27,8
endogenous 0
0,3
52,4
46,0
36,0
23,0
0,0      
Table 5:
 Depreciation allowances and rates of DhVSiCal de reciation. Percent 1989.
Ordinary rates of
depreciation
allowances
Rates of
immediate
write-offs
Rates of physical
depreciation
Commercial buildings 3,0 3,0 2,1
Buildings and structures 7,4 10,8 2,5
Transport equipment except ships,
fishing vessels and airplanes 25,9 0 32,0
Machinery except oil rigs etc. 30,0 33,4 6,7
Shi
 .s, fishin s vessels and ai 'lanes_	 _ 25,0 29,5 11,5 
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Table 6: Effective tax rates on income from fixed capital by industry. Percent, 1989.
Exposed industries
Agriculture	 -21,0
Forestry	 -30,8
Fishing and breeding of fish etc.	 -12,4
Manufacture of Consumption Goods 	 -43,1
Manufacture of Intermediate Inputs and Capital Goods	 -42,4
Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles	 -42,1
Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals	 -40,6
Petroleum Refining	 -43,5
Manufacture of Metals	 -42,6
Manufacture of Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment	 -45,8
Building of Ships and Oil-Platforms	 -45,4
Sheltered industries
Production of Electricity	 ••
Construction, excl. Oil Well Drilling	 -33,6
Wholesale and Retail Trade	 -20,1
Domestic Transport	 -36,8
Finance and Insurance	 -45,0
Dwelling services	 -75,7
Other Private Services	 -43,2■■•
".." means that data are not available.
The resulting figures in table 6 indicate that the effective tax rate on income from fixed capital is lower
than the tax rate on income from financial assets. The main reason is that the depreciation allowances
exceed the assumed rates of economic depreciation. This gives rise to a tax credit since taxation is
postponed. Dwellings represent an extreme case of non-neutral taxation because the imputed tax value
on dwellings is very low compared to the market value. The calculations show small differences in
the effective tax rates between the manufacturing industries. However, the effect on total unit costs
may vary between sectors not only because the effective tax rates differ, but also because of
differences in the direct and indirect use of capital services per unit of output.
4 Computation of Effective Rates of Assistance
Our most aggregate measure of ERA includes the effect of
• nominal tariffs
• NTBs measured by equivalent tariffs
• indirect taxes and subsidies 12
• capital income taxation
• price discrimination in the electricity market
121ndirect taxes considered not to affect the profitability of private industries are excluded from the analysis, see section 3.1.
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When computing the ERA from the separate policy measures, all other forms of assistance have been
kept unchanged. Regarding constant 1989-levels of non-tariff protection, we have, as our base case,
assumed that equivalent tariff rates are kept unchanged, cf. the discussion in section 2. This choice is
made primarily of expositional reasons since it facilitates the decomposition of the total ERAs into
ERA-effects from the separate categories of policy measures. However, in subsection 4.2 we
illustrate how the results are affected when we choose the alternative interpretation of unchanged non-
tariff protection.
4.1 Total and separate ERA-effects (Constant equivalent tariff rates)
Table 7 reports ERA-effects of the policy measures listed above with reference to 1989. Table 8
provides additional information about the most important changes in the income and cost components
in the 19 specified industries when the various forms of assistance are abolished.
Table 7:
 ERA effects of different policy measures. Percent, 1989.
Potentially exposed
industries
Nomina
1 tariffs
(ERP)
Non-
tariff
barriers
Indirect
taxes
and
subsidies
Capital
income
taxation
Regulated
electricity
prices
Second
order
effects13
Total
Agriculture -0,1 -49,0 -67,3 -12,4 0,1 0,8 -128,3
Forestry -0,1 2,4 -9,6 -7,6 0 -0,0 -14,9
Fishing and breeding of
Fish etc. 0,9 5,8 -28,2 -7,5 0,9 -0,1 -28,2
Manufacture of
Consumption -2,7 18,2 6,2 -8,4 0,6 -1,1 12,9
Goods
Manufacture of Intermediate
Inputs and Capital Goods -0,7 -6,2 -1,0 -7,1 -0,1 0,0 -15,0
Manufacture of Pulp and
Paper Articles 0,4 1,4 4,9 -13,2 -10,9 0 -17,4
Manufacture of Industrial
Chemicals -0,3 -6,9 6,1 -9,8 -1,7 0,0 -12,6
Petroleum Refining -0,1 -0,8 12,3 -10,6 -0,7 0 0,1
Manufacture of Metals -0,1 0,8 12,3 -11,7 -15,8 0 -14,5
Manufacture of Metal
Products, Machinery and
Equipment -1,3 -6,1 0,2 -5,6 0,2 0,1 -12,5
Building of Ships and Oil-
Platforms 0,5 -18,5 -12,3 -6,8 0,5 0 -36,7
i 3These effects arise because a removal of some policy measures affect the basis for other measures. For example, removal
of non-tariff trade barriers may reduce the basis for ad valorem indirect taxes.
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Table 8: A decom osition of the total ERA effects into shifts in income and cost components.
Change in net
sector subsidies
in percent of
gross production
value
Change in
equivalent
tariff rates,
percentage
points
Change in
producer
price, percent
Change in
the input
price,
percent
Potentially exposed industries
Agriculture 43,4 -190,0 -66,3 -22,8
Forestry 5,8 - -0,2 -12,8
Fishing and breeding of Fish etc. 10,0 - 0,0 -6,0
Manufacture of Consumption
Goods 0,4 -9,3 <-9,7, -11,6> -20,1
Manufacture of Intermediate Inputs
and Capital Goods 1,3 -3,3 -3,7 -2,1
Manufacture of Pulp and Paper
Articles 0,3 - 0,0 21,4
Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals 0,2 -3,2 -3,5 -2,7
Petroleum Refining 0,0 - 0,0 -2,2
Manufacture of Metals 0,4 - -0,2 0,2
Manufacture of Metal Products,
Machinery and Equipment 0,6 -3,2 <-3,1, -4,1> -1,9
Building of Ships and Oil-Platforms 2,5 -7,7 -7,2 -3,5
Sheltered industries
Production of Electricity 0,0 - -0,2 -0,7
Construction, excl. Oil Well Drilling -0,2 - -1,1 -2,4
Wholesale and Retail Trade -2,1 - -2,4 -1,9
Domestic Transport -0,3 - 3,3 -2,3
Finance and Insurance -0,4 - 4,6 -2,7
Dwelling services -0,4 - 110,4 -1,6
Other Private Services -0,3 - -0,5 -4,4
"-" means nil.
The figures of total ERA in the last column in table 6 show that all industries except Manufacture of
Consumption Goods and Petroleum Refining were assisted in 1989. As pointed out in section 1, it is
the relative ERA-effects that cause those distortions of the allocation of value added factors.
attributable to industry assistance policy. In order to draw conclusions about these distortions, some
kind of an average measure of assistance should be calculated, and the sectorial ERA figures should be
ranked with this as a reference. However, it is not clear how such an average should be defined, and
we make no attempt in trying to identify such a reference point. Instead, we comment on the results as
they appear in table 7 and 8.
Agriculture stands out as the far most supported sector. Actually, since the fall in ERA is more than
100 percent, the calculation indicates that agriculture would not be able at all to pay for labour and
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capital services if the sector is not compensated in connection with a removal of the assistance. Next to
agriculture, the sector Building of Ships and Oil Platforms receives significant assistance. The
remuneration to labour and capital (value added) would have to be reduced by 36,7 percent in 1989.
Fishery is also relatively more supported than other industries according to the calculations. The
effective assistance to the primary factors in the remaining exposed industries (except Manufacture of
Consumption Goods and Petroleum Refining) was roughly neutral since the relative reduction in ERA
is approximately uniform (12 - 14 percent). Manufacturing of Consumption Goods is the only sector
which would benefit substantially (12,9 percent) from a removal of the policy measures considered.
Some points should be recalled when interpreting the ERA figures. First, the industry classification of
the private business sector is quite aggregated. Hence, the industries are rather heterogeneous, and the
ERA-figure for an industry may provide little insight about the effective assistance to particular
activities within an industry group. The policy measures may be directed unevenly to these
subactivities, and differences in the cost structure imply different effects of the various measures.
Virtually, the profitability prior to policy changes also differs between activities within the same
industry. In particular, it is unrealistic that all kinds of agricultural production will disappear in
Norway as a consequence of the policy changes considered in this study. Second, the ERA-
computations disregard substitution possibilities that will reduce shifts in costs due to policy changes.
Third, ERA is meant to provide information about fundamental structural patterns brought about by
adjustments over a relatively long period. The calculated ERA-figures refer to the actual situation in
1989 which may include characteristics which are untypical for a longer period. For instance, changes
in world prices change the equivalent tariff rates related to NTBs.
Table 7 also include partial ERA-effects from the separate categories of policy measures, calcilated by
keeping the other supportive measures constant. The results show that for most of the potentially
exposed industries indirect taxes, non-tariff trade barriers and capital income taxation have the greatest
impact on the ability to remunerate labour and capital. The ERP figures (the column for nominal
tariffs) are seen to be quite negligible compared to the total ERA figures. In spite of the weaknesses
pointed out above concerning the treatment of nominal tariffs, we still think that the figures make a
good case for switching focus from ERP to ERA.
Subsidies and non-tariff protection are the main ERA determinants in Agriculture, constituting 52,6
and 38,3 percent respectively of the total effects. As seen from table 7, the removal of NTBs implies
that the output prices in this sector on average are reduced to 1/3 of the price level in 1989. Compared
to such a drastic decline in output prices it turns out rather insignificant that the prices of material
inputs fall by close to 23 percent. As to subsidies, agriculture loses 11,5 bill. NOK in net sector
transfers which amounts to 43 percent of the value of gross production in 1989. The ERA effect from
indirect taxes and subsidies separately includes commodity taxes as well as subsidies given more
directly to the sector. The commodity taxes affect the input prices paid by the sector. Still, a more
detailed examination of the results reveals that the sector subsidies dominate the total assistance from
indirect taxes and subsidies.
The results for Fishery illustrate that removal of protection may have significant ERA-effects even for
industries that do not directly benefit from import barriers. Remuneration to labour and capital in this
sector can increase by 5,8 percent if all quantitative import barriers were eliminated. The reason is
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that the average price of intermediate inputs falls by 3 percent. This gain is roughly neutralised by the
joint effect of increasing the capital income taxation and removing nominal tariffs. Hence, the total
ERA is almost identical to the ERA effect from the indirect taxes and subsidies.
The decomposition of the total ERA effect for the sector Building of Ships and Oil-Platforms indicates
that half of the total assistance were provided through non-tariff import barriers and the remaining
share was caused by the tax system. However, these average figures turn out to be rather misleading
for the two major activities in the sector. While the ship building industry receives significant support
through net sector subsidies (about 1 bill. NOK net), sector subsidies are unimportant for the part of
the industry supplying the petroleum sector. On the other hand, ship building is not protected by
import barriers, whereas this seemed to be the case in 1989 for deliveries to the petroleum sector. As
pointed out in section 3.2, price differentials between domestic and foreign producers, combined with
the actual assignment of contracts, indicate that domestic producers were favoured. Elimination of
this kind of import barrier will reduce the output price faced by the producers of oil platforms etc. by
11 percent, see section 3.2. The decline in the average output price for the sector as a whole is 7,2
percent when the price changes are weighted with the shares of gross production. Hence, the picture
of this sector reveals that ship building and building of oil platforms etc. should be treated as two
separate industries in a more appropriate choice of industry classification.
Another heterogeneous industry is the sector Manufacture of Consumption Goods, which is the main
producer of processed commodities from agriculture and fishery, in addition to beverages, tobacco,
textiles and wearing apparels. The sector received a relatively modest amount of net sector subsidies
in 1989 (0,4 percent of gross production value), but the benefit from non-tariff protection is estimated
to correspond to an average equivalent tariff rate of 9,3 percent. On this background, it may seem
contra intuitive that the remuneration to labour and capital can be increased by 12,9 percent when all
policy measures are removed (the total ERA effect). The main reason is that input prices fall by 20,1
percent as seen in table 8. Lower equivalent tariff rates on inputs account for 17,2 percentage points
of the reduction. This effect is by far most important in the processing of agricultural products for
which the prices drop to 1/3 of the initial level. More detailed calculations reveal that a reduction of
input prices by 2,8 and 0,9 percent respectively can be attributed to lower indirect taxes and nominal
tariff rates on inputs. Thus, the results for this sector again constitutes an instructive example of the
importance of accounting for changes in prices of intermediate inputs when assessing the effective
assistance. At the same time the results for this sector again stress the point that a more disaggregated
analysis would have been preferable; the picture that emerges from the results for the sector as a whole
is misleading for important subactivities. The fact that the sector stands out as the most discriminated
by the policy measures in 1989 is clearly not representative for the subactivity production of textiles.
Among the remaining manufacturing industries, the remuneration to value added in Petroleum
Refining is almost unaffected by the removal of all policy measures. Taken together, government
assistance is thus unimportant for this industry. The total ERA result is due to a cost reduction on
inputs caused by reduced indirect taxation, which neutralises the effect of a somewhat higher effective
taxation of capital income. For the other manufacturing industries, it is a common pattern that even
though the total ERA figures are of the same magnitude, there are substantial differences with respect
to the impacts of the various policy measures. Neutralisation of the capital income taxation implies a
reduction of ERA by 6 - 13 percent. It should be recalled that in addition to the direct effect, changes
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in the effective taxation of capital income have indirect effects on the prices of intermediate inputs due
to changes in costs in the sheltered sectors. However, separate calculations show that in most of the
sectors the input prices rise by less than 1 percent and that the indirect effects are small compared to
the direct effects.
Except for Manufacture of Intermediate Inputs and Capital Goods and Building of Ships and Oil-
Pla#Orms, all manufacturing industries would have benefited from removing indirect taxes and
subsidies. The reason is that they received relatively small net sector subsidies, whereas the reduction
in costs due to lower indirect tax rates and prices of non-traded commodities is important. For
industries such as Petroleum Refining and Metal Production, abolishing the taxes on electricity and
mineral oil has significant ERA effects.
Trade liberalisation is the most important component in the total ERA in Manufacture of Intermediate
Inputs and Capital Goods, Chemical Raw Materials and Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment.
Each of these industries loses effective tariff rates equal to 3,2 - 3,3 percent. The corresponding
reduction in ERA lies in the interval of 6 - 7 percent.
Not surprisingly, the calculations show that the energy intensive sectors Manufacture of Metals and
Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles were strongly subsidised in 1989 through the regulations of
the electricity market. The fall in ERA is 15,8 and 10,9 percent respectively. The ERA effect in the
sector Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals is much smaller, reflecting that this sector was not
subsidised to the same extent through cheap hydro power as the other energy intensive industries.
As pointed out in section 2, the change in the producer price summarises the net effect of the various
policy measures on costs and incomes for sheltered industries. Dwelling services stands out as
strongly subsidised in 1989; the producer price would have to increase by 110 percent in order to
break even. The far most important subsidy component in this extremely capital intensive sector, is
the favourable taxation of capital income. Recall that the effective tax rate on capital income from
dwelling services was estimated to be -76 percent in 1989, see table 6. For the other sheltered sectors
the net cost effect of an abolishment of all measures is much more uncertain a priori because of
contradictory effects. Input prices are reduced but so are also net sector subsidies whereas capital
income taxation increases. The calculations show that the net unit costs increase by 3,4 percent in
Domestic Transport and by 4,6 percent in Finance and Insurance respectively. For the remaining
sheltered industries the net cost effect is weakly negative.
4.2 ERA-effects when equivalent tariff rates adjust endogenously
In section 2 it was pointed out that one can give different interpretation of the assumption of constant
NTBs. While the equivalent tariff rates were kept constant in the calculations presented above, in the
calculations reported in this section they are allowed to adjust endogenously. The purpose is to
illustrate how the two polar interpretations of constant non-tariff trade barriers affect the ERAs. This
is done by calculating partial ERA-effects of similar changes in indirect taxes and subsidies as those
examined in section 4.1. In table 9 the results are presented and compared with the case of constant
equivalent tariff rates.
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Table 9: The ERA-effect of indirect taxes and subsidies. Percent, 1989
.	
Potentially exposed industries
Endogenous
equivalent
tariff rates
Constant
equivalent
tariff rates
Agriculture - -67,3
Forestry -12,8 -9,6
Fishing and breeding of Fish etc. -37,4 -28,2
Manufacture of Consumption Goods - 6,2
Manufacture of Intermediate Inputs and Capital Goods - -1,0
Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles 4,5 4,9
Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals - 6,1
Petroleum Refining 12,2 12,3
Manufacture of Metals 12,1 12,3
Manufacture of Metal Products, Machinery and Equipment - 0,2
Buildin • of Shi o s and Oil-Platforms - -12,3
"-" means nil.
With equivalent tariff rates adjusting endogenously, ERA-effects can be calculated for only five of the
eleven potentially exposed industries. The figures show that the net factor income in these 5 industries
decreases more than when equivalent tariff rates are kept constant. The changes in indirect taxes and
subsidies have a positive effect on net factor income in the five industries, and the positive price
adjustment in protected sectors implies an increase in the input costs in exposed industries. However,
this indirect influence is important only in Forestry and Fishing and breeding of Fish etc.
5. Conclusion
The present study indicates that most of the potentially exposed industries in Norway were effectively
assisted through various forms of policy measures in 1989. In addition to budgetary subsidies,
substantial support is given through other and less transparent channels. Non-tariff import barriers
seem to be especially important in this respect, whereas the assistance from nominal tariffs,
summarised by the standard ERP measure, is relatively small.
Before one can draw conclusions about the impact on resource allocation from the policy measures
considered, the ERA figures for each sector should be compared to some kind of average ERA
measure for the business sector as a whole. However, the reported ERA figures for Norway obviously
provide considerable information about the most significant distortions of the relative net-of-tax
remuneration to the value added factors. It is little doubt that the sectors Agriculture, Fishery and
Building of Ships and Oil PlaY'orms were relatively more supported than the business sector as whole
in 1989, irrespective of the precise definition of a reference point. The fact that almost all industries
were assisted also implies that the change in the relative net-of-tax remuneration, if intended, could
have been brought about at a lower level of government interference.
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